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Abstract
Using detailed firm-product-year data across manufacturing industries in India, and exploiting the
exogenous nature of China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, we investigate the link between the impact
of import penetration from China on the product variety of Indian manufacturing firms. We find: (i)
robust and significant effects of product drop, with the effect coming only from competitive pressure
in the domestic market; (ii) robust evidence of product drop or ‘creative destruction’ only for firms
belonging to the lower-half of the size distribution; (iii) firms drop their peripheral/marginal products
and concentrate on the core ones; and (iv) our result is strongest for firms producing intermediate goods.
For an average Indian manufacturing firm, a 10 percentage point increase in India’s Chinese share of
imports in the domestic market reduces the product scope of firms by 1.7—4.4%. In contrast, we find
positive effects on product scope when firms are importing intermediate goods. We also find evidence of
significant productivity effects and within-firm factor reallocation. Our results are consistent to a battery
of robustness checks and IV estimation.
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China’s export performance post-1990, and more so since 2001 (with entry to the WTO), has been nothing
short of spectacular! Its exports grew from US$ 62 billion to US$ 1.2 trillion between 1990 and 20071 ; an
average of around 20% per year (Iacovone et al., 2013). In the same period, China’s share of GDP more than
doubled, from 15.9 to 34.9%. In terms of the sectoral composition, manufacturing exports accounted for 89%
of total merchandise exports between 2000 and 2005.2 On the back of this very strong export performance,
China became the world’s largest exporter in 2009, and the second largest economy in 2010 (Iacovone et
al., 2013).3 Naturally, this meteoric rise of China to the status of a global exporting giant, particularly in
terms of manufactured goods, has induced economists to understand the effects of import competition from
low-wage countries, specifically China, on various firm- and industry-level outcomes of developed countries
(Bernard et al., 2006; Liu, 2010; Autor et al., 2013; Mion and Zhu, 2013; Martin and Mejean, 2014; Bloom
et al., 2016), and to a far lesser extent for developing countries (see for example, Iacavone et al., 2013, and
Utar and Ruiz, 2013 for Mexico and; Medina, 2017 for Peru).
Our study adds to this relatively small (but growing) literature by exploring the causal effects of Chinese
import competition on developing countries. In particular, we attempt to understand what happens to
product mix/scope in India, a large developing country, when it faces competition from another equally
large developing country, China. We find that an increase in the import share from China forces Indian
manufacturing firms, more so for small and medium-sized firms (lower half of the size distribution) with no
effect for big firms, to drop their peripheral products while concentrating on the core ones. Our results also
show that the effect is strongest for firms producing intermediate inputs.
Our primary motivation to study the effects of Chinese import competition on the product variety of
Indian (manufacturing) firms comes from the following reasons: (i) a recently released research document
from the Offi ce of the Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India highlights
a significant surge in the growth in the share of imports from China, especially in the post-WTO membership
(of China) period. The study uses 268 items for the period of 2004-05 to 2010-11 to find that while the
import index (for these 268 items) from all countries grew by 1773.1%, in case of imports from China, the
index increased by 4618.4% over the same period. Additionally, the share of imports of these 268 items from
China in total imports jumped to 41.3% in 2010-11 from 25.3% in 2005-06 (Singh, 2012).
Figure 1 shows a monotonically upward trend in the share of India’s manufacturing imports from China
1 In real terms, exports increased by a factor of 25 between 1990 and 2005 (Hanson and Robertson, 2010).
2 In 2014, manufacturing exports of China accounted for more than US$ 1.4 trillion of total exports of US$ 2.34 trillion.
3Like China, India also experienced a tremendous increase in exports in the post-1990 period: both as a share of GDP and
as a share of world exports. For example, total exports as a share of GDP increased from almost 10% in 1995 to approximately
25% in 2013. Over the same period (1995—2013), Indian goods export as a share of world goods export almost tripled to 1.7%,
while the share of services exports in world service exports also tripled to over 3% between 2000 and 2013 (Anand et al., 2015).
Finally, for the period 1992—2005, manufacturing accounted for 75.3% of India’s merchandise exports.
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in total manufacturing imports. This share rises by approximately 15 percentage points from roughly 1% of
total imports in 1992 to almost 16% in 2007 (this figure increases further to around 26% in 2017). Particularly
striking is the dramatic increase in the import share in the post-2001 period i.e., following China’s accession
to the WTO in December, 2001. Between 1992 and 2001, China’s share of Indian imports grew from 1%
to around 5.5%, which shot to 16% between 2002-2007; an increase of 10.5 percentage points over a shorter
period relative to the pre-2001 period (where the increase was 4.5 percentage points).
Table 1 documents India’s trade (both exports and imports) with China and imports from other major
regions of the world, including total imports, at three different periods of time: 1992, 2001 and 2007. It
shows that China accounted for the largest increase in India’s imports relative to the other countries and
major regions of the world. India’s share of Chinese imports grew by around 9000% between 1992 and 2007.4
In comparison, imports from ASEAN (one of the biggest trading partners of India), the US and EU increased
by 888%, 230% and 132%, respectively. Compared to Mexico5 , where the Chinese share of manufacturing
imports increased by a factor of 8, in the case of India it increased by a factor greater than 90 over the same
time period (1992 - 2007).
With respect to India’s exports to China, there has also been a significant increase but the rate of increase
is far lower than the increase in import flows from China; the increase in exports is close to one-third to
that of imports. In the process, China became the largest trading partner of India with a total trade of
US$ 84.44 billion in 2014-15. India’s trade deficit with China also ballooned nine-fold over the past decade
to US$ 52.7 billion in 2015-16 (EXIM Bank of India, 2016).6 Following Iacovone et al. (2013), where the
authors argue about the immediate effect of the rise of China on middle-income countries, the effect on the
performance of Indian manufacturing firms seems to be of the first order importance. This brings us to our
second motivation.
(ii) An online campaign against the Chinese goods started after the national secretary of the current
ruling political party (Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP, which came to power in 2014) called for a boycott of
the Chinese products in 2014. The online campaign against Chinese goods got further attention as reports
started to show that this increase in Chinese imports may hurt India’s factories on the background of the
‘Make in India’campaign launched by the current Prime Minister of India.7 The reports also show that
cheap imports from China has been a problem area for small Indian businesses.8 The Commerce Minister
4Note that the percentage increase in Chinese imports in case of India is almost 9 times higher when compared to the US
during the same time period; the percentage increase for the US was 1156 during 1991-2007 (Autor et al., 2013).
5A large number of studies exploring the impact of Chinese import competition on developing countries is focused on Mexico
(Iacovone et al., 2013; Utar and Torres-Ruiz, 2013).
6 In light of this steep increase in the share of Chinese imports in India and a growing trade deficit with China there has
been increased calls in India for its policymakers to introduce anti-dumping measures against China (Singh, 2012). Out of the
290 anti-dumping cases investigated by the Director General of Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties against various countries since
1992, 159 cases involve imports from China (PTI, August 12, 2013).
7Also see http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/flood-of-cheap-chinese-imports-may-hurt-indias-factories-1738045
8 In recent years Chinese imports have changed from low-value, low-cost products such as children toys to high-value items
like electronic products, engineering goods, auto components, and chemicals.
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of India also raised the issue of cheap Chinese goods flooding the Indian market, hurting its traders and
manufacturing sectors on her visit to China (after the current ruling party came to power in May 2014).9
She mentioned that imports of textile machinery (an intermediate good) from China are among the biggest
threats to small manufacturers.
Given this as our background, China being currently the biggest trading partner of India and anecdotal
evidence of Chinese products hurting the Indian manufacturers, we are interested to know the nature of
the response (if any) from Indian manufacturing firms. Whereas trade theory identifies low-wage countries
as a likely source of disruption to high-wage countries’manufacturing firms, Krugman (2008) points out
that free trade with countries of any income level may affect the dynamics of the domestic market. On
the other hand, a large body of empirical evidence demonstrates that import competition, especially from
China, significantly affects dynamics of manufacturing firms; the lion’s share (of these studies) concentrating
on developed countries. Our focus is slightly different in the sense that we investigate the effect (of the rise
in Chinese imports) on product variety of Indian firms. In other words, what happens to product mix of
manufacturing firms, when there is a significant rise in South-South trade? Do we get same kind of evidence?
For example, did the increase in competition from China cause Indian firms to rationalize their product mix
by focusing on their core products and drop the peripheral ones? This is the first contribution of our paper.10
Next, our aim is to establish a causal link between increase in imports from China and product scope of
Indian firms. To understand such, we follow the literature on the rise of Chinese imports and its effect on
labour markets in developed countries (Autor et al., 2013), and use one of the most important episodes of
world trade in the last two decades: China’s membership to the WTO in 2001 as a suitable quasi-natural
experiment to investigate how does China’s unilateral trade liberalization policies cause Indian firms to alter
their product mix.11 The growth in Chinese exports to India as a result of accession to the WTO that we
examine is a result of China’s internal reforms to a market-oriented economy. This transition to a market
(from central planning) economy resulted in significant productivity growth for Chinese firms, which got
further bolstered due to reduction in trade costs as a result of its accession to the WTO. We treat this as a
unilateral trade shock and not a mutual trade expansion. All the existing empirical studies, which investigates
the effect of Chinese imports on product scope of firms, focus only on the yearly change in Chinese imports.12
9Please also see https://www.deccanherald.com/content/424157/india-raises-issue-cheap-chinese.html
10Another motivation is whether the technological similarity between China and India would yield different results compared
to other cases where this is not so. di Giovanni et al. (2014) on examining the global welfare impacts of China’s trade integration
and technological change ranks ten developing countries in terms of technological similarity to China. Among this group of
countries, India is ranked as the country with the closest technological proximity to China; India’s technological similarity index
being 0.928 to that of China. Table 10 in Appendix B shows all ten countries in decreasing order of technological similarity
to China.
11There is precedence in the literature to treat the sharp rise in China’s share in total imports of countries (both developed
and developing) because of its accession to the WTO in 2001 as a quasi-natural experiment (see, Lu and Yu, 2015; Bloom et
al., 2016).
12Focusing on yearly changes or using first-difference estimator helps to address the problem of omitted variables, especially
the unobservable characteristics. But, the effi ciency of the first-difference estimator crucially depends on the assumption of the
error term being a random walk. Almost all the studies focusing on Chinese participation in the world trade matrix recognizes
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We use 2001 as the structural break to compare the product space of Indian firms between 1992-2001 and
2002-2007 through a Bartik-type estimation method. Nonetheless, following the literature we also exploit
the yearly change in the share of Chinese imports as our preferred specification when using the IV method
to get more economically meaningful estimates.13 This is the second contribution of our paper.
However, this approach also requires the fact that the import demand shocks in India, especially after
2001 are not the primary cause of China’s export surge. While it seems plausible that China’s export growth
to India during the 2000s is a result of China’s internal supply shocks, using accession to the WTO to
estimate a difference-in-difference model (comparing the imports before and after 2001) will help us estimate
the precise effects by taking care of the unobserved factors. We also adopt an alternative estimation strategy
where we use Chinese imports to European countries as an instrument for Chinese imports to India. All
approaches yield similar results.
Lastly, India and China are two of the more economically successful BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa) countries and their interactions in the sphere of international trade and the outcomes are,
in our view, worthy of an enquiry. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the
effects of import competition on firm performance in relation to two BRICS countries.
We provide a careful investigation of the causal impact of Chinese competition focusing on the extensive
margin of Indian firms, using detailed firm-product-level data. Likewise domestic market, we recognize that
Indian firms facing Chinese competition is likely to feel the same threat in one of its main export market,
the US.14 We, therefore, evaluate these causal links by not only looking at the threat in the domestic
or home market but also for the US. To do so, we use China’s WTO accession in 2001 as the quasi-
natural experiment and differential increase in competitive pressure of Chinese imports across manufacturing
industries to implement a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. In particular, we exploit the average
share of Chinese imports across each 4-digit industry (in both India and the US) in the pre-WTO accession
period (between 1992 and 2001) and then interact it with a WTO accession dummy (it takes a value 1 if
year is greater than or equal to 2002).15 This interaction term captures the differential effect of Chinese
that there has been a structural change in China’s trade after 2001, i.e., after China’s participation in the WTO. And, this can
possibly violate the assumption of random walk of the error term.
13Using a structural break is common (Lu and Yu, 2015) when applying tariffs as the main variable of interest. Since we
are using the difference in the share of Chinese imports before and after the year 2001, a Bartik-type RHS variable, it makes
the magnitudes hard to interpret, especially in case of an IV analysis. Nevertheless, Table 17 of Appendix B shows the IV
estimation using the Bartik-type RHS variable. The results are similar like the usual IV estimation.
14We focus on the USA as our preferred export destination because of the following reasons: (i) the USA is the largest trading
partner of India in terms of exports. India exported US$ 40.4 billion in 2017; this accounted for about 15.3% of India’s total
exports. The same figure (percentage of exports to US) was around 16% for 2007. In the case of China, the percentage share
of exports to the US was around 19% in 2007. So, for both China and India, the US can possibly be regarded as their primary
export market; (ii) the USA is among the very few trade destinations of India with which India maintains a trade surplus; the
same is for China; and (iii) the income elasticity of demand for India’s exports is estimated to be the highest in case of the
USA, which is 2.5, while for global exports, it is 1.9 (UNCTAD, 2009). Nonetheless, we have also used US, EU and ASEAN
combined together as an alternate export destination, and the results remain the same.
15All the studies which investigate the effect of Chinese competition on industry and firm outcomes in other countries, such
as Iacovone et al. (2013), Autor et al. (2013), or in case of imports from low-wage countries, such as Bernard et al. (2006), Liu
(2010), use share of imports at the industry-level to measure the extend of import competition. We follow these papers and
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competition on firms according to their trade exposure from China prior to 2001. In other words, since
we expect shares of Chinese imports to rise across all sectors, more so for sectors with higher share before
China’s WTO accession, it is the change in imports due to the accession to the WTO, net of the general
change post-2001, and net of possible permanent differences across industries.
We find strong heterogeneous effects of Chinese competitive shock on the extensive (product drop or
exit) margin. In particular, we find robust evidence of product drop or ‘creative destruction’ for firms
belonging to the lower-half of the size distribution (1st and 2nd quartile), i.e., small and medium-sized firms.
All these effects are strictly concentrated due to competitive pressure of Chinese imports in the home and
not export market. Our coeffi cients indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in India’s Chinese share
of imports reduces the product scope of manufacturing firms by 1.7—4.4% at the mean. Our results also
provide significant evidence of product reallocation within firms as competition obliges them to focus on
their core competencies; a finding consistent with the ‘core-competency’hypothesis of the multi-product
firms (Eckel and Neary, 2010). Relatedly, we find that focusing on core-product(s) help firms to upgrade
their productivity (Mayer et al., 2014) and within-firm reallocation of other productive factors. The effect of
‘creative destruction’in response to Chinese imports is acute in case of (i) both exporters and non-exporters,
and (ii) only domestic firms. Our results remain unchanged with instrumental variable (IV) analysis. On
the other hand, we find significant positive effects of Chinese competition (at the domestic market), when
we look at import of intermediate goods rather than total imports.
Our paper contributes to a vibrant literature that links how import competition affects product scope of
firms. Results show (i) that firms alter their product mix by dropping their peripheral products or products
with high marginal costs (Baldwin and Gu, 2009; Liu, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011; Iacovone et al., 2013), and
(ii) there is substantial heterogeneity in product scope adjustment —firms above a cut-off of size distribution
expand product scope, whereas other reduce it (Dhingra, 2013; Qiu and Zhou, 2013; Lopresti, 2016). Within
this literature, our paper is most closely related to Iacovone et al. (2013), which investigates the effect of
Chinese import competition (for both domestic and export market) on product mix of Mexican firms. While
we focus on Chinese import competition and product mix of Indian manufacturing firms, our paper differs
from Iacovone et al. (2013) along several other dimensions.
First, methodologically. While they use only yearly changes in Chinese imports (treating emergence of
China onto world markets as a quasi-natural experiment), our focus is on the difference between imports
before and after 2001 (treating China’s accession to the WTO as a quasi-natural). Second, while we focus
on the effect of competitive pressure from both domestic and foreign market by putting them together (in
all estimations), they estimate the effects separately.16 Third, our results based on quartile regressions
undertake similar kind of strategy. We discuss this in detail later, specifically in Section 4.1.
16Estimating these two effects separately may not reflect the true estimates as a firm is selling products in both these markets
simultaneously.
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(both OLS and IV) clearly show that it is the firms from the lower-half of the size distribution who drop
their peripheral products in response to Chinese competition at the domestic market, whereas their quantile
regressions are only focuses on intensive (plant sales) and not on extensive margin (neither on product exit
nor core products). Fourth, the context of the rise in India-China trade is significantly different from Mexico-
China. The former ones are two of the fastest growing economies of the world and China is currently the
largest trading partner of India. Chinese imports in India increased more than 10 times higher than that of
Mexico, especially after 2001.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review and discuss both theoretical and empirical
literature related to our paper in Section 2. Section 3 describes the datasets we use in the paper, together
with some preliminary analyses. We investigate the direct impact of Chinese import competition, in both
domestic and export markets, on the product variety of Indian manufacturing firms in Section 4. Section
5 digs deeper to understand the mechanism behind the effect by focusing on core competency, product-
sales composition and product exit. We look at within-firm responses by looking at productivity effects,
productive factors and sales (intensive margin) in Section 6. We divide the sample of firms according to
product, industry and firm characteristics to investigate further heterogeneity in our results in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Review of Literature
This section discusses the literature that is most closely related to our work, namely, the studies on multi-
product firms, more so their responses to trade shocks and our contribution to the literature. Trade econo-
mists have developed a range of theoretical models focusing on the behavior of multi-product firms over the
last decade or so (Lopresti, 2016).17 The most common prediction regarding the firm-product-level response
to a bilateral reduction in trade cost: all firms reduce their product scope by dropping their peripheral
or least popular products (Baldwin and Gu, 2009; Eckel and Neary, 2010; Mayer et al., 2014).18 One of
the earlier studies, which focuses on how firms adjust their product mix (in case of US plants) in response
to the import competition from low-wage countries, is by Bernard et al. (2006). They argue that plants
are more likely to switch industries when exposure to low-wage countries is high; an average of almost 8%
of surviving plants in each five-year period switch industries i.e., change their product mix. Instead, we
focus on the impact of import competition from a low-wage country on the product mix of firms in another
similar low-wage country. In doing so, we exploit a unilateral trade liberalization shock by China and show
17See Lopresti (2016) for a detailed review of some of the more well cited theoretical models of the multi-product firm in the
literature.
18All these models assume that marginal costs of production vary across products within a firm. In these models, firms each
have a core competence, a variety in which the marginal cost of production is lowest, with each additional variety becoming
progressively ineffi cient. As trade costs fall and competition in the domestic market rises, all firms choose to reduce product
scope, dropping products with the highest marginal costs. Bernard et al. (2011) proposes a multiproduct Melitz-type model in
which the firm-product level response to trade liberalization is ambiguous.
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that firms from India reduce their product scope, as a response to higher share of imports from China, by
dropping their peripheral products. And, the effect is most acutely felt in intermediate goods industry.
Next, there is a range of papers that predict heterogeneous responses across the firm distribution, with
the most productive firms expanding product scope as trade costs fall, while the others contract product
scope. Dhingra (2013), categorizing firms as a ‘brand’, argues that varieties within a brand are closer
substitutes than varieties across brands, and a cannibalization effect (eating away of the demand for existing
products) happens when there is product expansion. Trade liberalization or import competition reduces
the cannibalization effect by dropping products. She also points out a cut-off in the distribution of firms
in terms of exports; firms having a larger export share of sales than the cut-off adds products as a result
of trade liberalization, while firms below the cut-off drop products. Qiu and Zhou (2013) reach a similar
conclusion as Dhingra (2013) but by allowing firms to differ in terms of productivity. Therefore, different
theoretical models on multi-product firms proffer very different and contradictory conclusions regarding the
way multi-product firms adjust their product mix in response to changes in trade costs.
Following these studies, we create a size distribution in terms of total sales and divides firms’ into
four different quartiles. We find that only firms belonging to lower-half of the size distribution alter their
product mix by re-focusing on their core product in response to Chinese import competition.19 We find
no effect for large firms unlike others. Our empirical findings therefore provide additional support to the
theoretical predictions; shedding light on the crucial issue of differential response or heterogeneity is one of
the fundamental aims of our paper.
Lopresti (2016) also finds heterogeneous effects, in terms of exposure to foreign markets, as a response to
a bilateral fall in trade costs. Nocke and Yeaple (2014) divide firms according to organizational capital and
organizational effi ciency and explore the effect with a fall in trade costs. Exporters take advantage of the fall
in trade costs (in terms of increased access to foreign markets) and increase product scope, whereas, firms
which produce strictly for the domestic markets reduce product scope as a result of increased competition
from abroad. We investigate import competition effects from both domestic and export market. We find
similar results, reduction of product scope, in case of competitive effects from domestic market with limited
effect, in terms of product expansion, for the marginally big exporters from competition in the foreign market.
Our paper also contributes to the empirical literature on multi-product firms. Bernard et al. (2011)
documents evidence of product-level responses of the U.S. multi-product firms to decline in Canadian tariff
rates on U.S. manufacturing imports that accompanied CUSFTA. They find that firms experiencing export
tariff reductions greater than the median reduces product scope relative to firms facing tariff reduction less
than the median. Iacovone et al. (2013) examines the effect of Chinese import competition on intensive and
extensive margins of Mexican firms and conclude that the import competition shock causes selection and
19We also use capital intensity as a basis for dividing firms according to size distribution and the results remain the same.
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reallocation at both firm- and product-level and that its impact is highly heterogeneous at the intensive and
extensive margins. Arkolakis et al. (2015) examine Brazilian exporters and point out that the importance
of firm-product extensive margin varies widely across firms of different sizes. We also look at the effect on
intensive margin (firm sales), but do not find any effect, except for the small firms (or firms belonging to the
1st quartile). The effect on total sales is completely driven by drop in domestic sales and not exports.
Baldwin and Gu (2009), Liu (2010) and Lopresti (2016), all investigate the responses of multi-product
firms to CUSFTA. Baldwin and Gu (2009) and Lopresti (2016) find heterogeneous responses between non-
exporters and exporters and within exporters, respectively, while Liu (2010) finds that multi-product firms
are more likely to drop peripheral products as import competition rises.20 We find similar responses by
firms within non-exporters and exporters. Both exporters and non-exporters drop products as a response to
Chinese import competition in the domestic market; however, the effect continues to be concentrated only
for small firms.
In all the theoretical models related to multi-product firms, a fall in trade costs increases within-firm
productivity by reallocation of resources within the firm (Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011; Mayer
et al., 2014). We also find similar evidences of increase in productivity and within-firm factor reallocation
in response to Chinese competitive pressure in the domestic market.
A different set of studies also look at the effect of import competition, or competition from China, on
different aspects of firms and industries, such as innovation, plant survival, employment growth, total sales,
productivity, skill intensity (Bernard et al., 2006; Utar and Ruiz, 2013; Mion and Zhu, 2013; Ashournia et
al., 2014; Balsvik et al., 2015; Bloom et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2016). Apart from Iacovone et al. (2013)
and Utar and Torres-Ruiz (2013)21 , all the other studies focus on the impact on developed economies (U.S.,
Belgium, Denmark, Norway, E.U., etc.). We differ from this current cohort of studies by focusing on two
most important countries contributing in the rise in South-South trade and explores the effect on product
variety of manufacturing firms. Overall, our results conform to the standard theoretical multi-product firm
literature with import competition, firms re-focusing more on their ‘core competencies’, with heterogeneity
in effect coming from the product drop by only the least productive or small firms.
There exists another section of studies, which looks at the dynamic aspects of multi-product firms or
product churning. Bernard et al. (2010) finds 54% of US manufacturing firms alter their product mix
every five years between Manufacturing Censuses. On average, one-third of the output of a given product
is produced by firms that either did not produce the product at the time of the previous Census or have
dropped the product by the next Census. In short, there is widespread evidence of product churning.
20 In a similar study, Martin and Mejean (2014) explore the impact of low-wage competition on the product quality of French
exporters. Their results show that product quality upgrading is greater in sectors and destinations where firms are exposed to
more intense competition from low-wage countries.
21Both the studies investigates the effect of Chinese competition on Mexico. The former looks at the product mix, whereas
the latter studies the labour market and industry-level changes.
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Moreover, this product churning has substantial effects on the aggregate economy because changes in the
firms’product mix can account for significant changes in their output over time (Lopresti, 2016; Goldberg
et al., 2013). Bernard et al. (2010, 2011) also shows that the contribution of firms’product margin toward
output growth exceeds the contribution of firms’entry and exit. Consequently, product mix changes represent
a potentially important channel through which resources are reallocated from less to more effi cient firms.
Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) also shows evidence of product churning by focusing on Mexican manufacturing
firms in response to NAFTA. Goldberg et al. (2010c) find no evidence of product churning within Indian
manufacturing firms and output-tariff declines following India’s episode of trade liberalization in 1991. Our
results, in turn, show significant evidence of product churning or ‘creative destruction’ in case of Indian
firms as a result of product market competition from China and the effect is stronger for firms producing
intermediate goods.
Lastly, our paper also contributes to a small literature on the effects of trade shocks on product variety
of Indian firms. Goldberg et al. (2010b) provides evidence of significant increase in domestic product variety
over the period 1989-2003 as a response to India’s input-tariff liberalization. They estimate that 25% of
the total increase in Indian manufacturing output over this period was accounted for by the net addition
of products at the firm-level. In contrast, our study shows that Indian firms reduce their product variety
because of competitive pressure in the domestic market and the effect is highest in case of intermediate
products. Indian firms started to stop producing intermediate goods when they gained access to wide range
of cheap intermediate inputs from China. This finding provides some possible evidence of trade diversion or
trade creation effects in case of Indian firms as they were previously importing a large portion of intermediate
goods from OECD countries (Kandilov et al., 2017).
3 Data and Preliminary Analysis
3.1 Datasets
3.1.1 Firm-level data (PROWESS)
The foundation of our empirical analysis is based on Indian firm-level data across different manufacturing
industries. This dataset gives detailed information on various indicators from the balance sheets of firms,
in addition to other important firm-level and industry-level characteristics. We discuss our dataset in detail
below.
The primary data source for our analysis is the PROWESS22 dataset, which is maintained by the Centre
for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE); a privately-owned business information company. This dataset
contains information primarily from the income statements and balance sheets of the listed (in major stock
22Our description of the PROWESS dataset draws heavily, but not exclusively, on the well-known studies of Goldberg et
al. (2010a, 2010b) and the recent study of de Loecker et al. (2016). All three studies have utilised manufacturing data from
PROWESS to conduct their empirical analyses and have provided excellent descriptions of the data.
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exchanges) companies and publicly traded firms. The PROWESS dataset contains information on about
27,400 publicly listed companies, of which almost 11,500 are in the manufacturing sector. We use information
for around 8000+ firms for our analysis for the years 1992-2007.23 Firms in the dataset are placed according
to the 5-digit 2008 National Industrial Classification (NIC) level, but are reclassified at the 4-digit 2004 NIC
level to facilitate matching with industry-level trade data.
The dataset covers large companies, companies listed on the major stock exchanges and many small
enterprises. Data for big companies are worked out from balance sheets, while CMIE periodically surveys
smaller companies for their data. Therefore, PROWESS provides a reasonably good aggregate picture in
terms of the mix of small and big firms. Further, it includes the set of variables typically found in firm-
level production datasets. For example, the dataset reports direct measures on gross value-added, capital
employed, total wages, total sales, exports, imports, research and development (R&D) expenditures, royalty
payments for technical know-how, assets, firm ownership, etc. The variables are measured in Indian Rupees
(INR) Million. Around 20% of the firms in the dataset belong to the Chemical and Pharmaceutical industries,
followed by Food Products and Beverages (13.74%), Textiles (10.99%) and Basic Metals (10.46%). We use
an unbalanced panel for our estimations.
PROWESS has some features and advantages over other available data sources, such as the Indian
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) dataset, that makes it particularly appealing and relevant for the period
and purpose of our study. First, in contrast to the repeated cross-section of earlier versions of the ASI,
PROWESS comprises a panel of firms, which enables us to track firms’performance over time.24 This will
enable us to undertake within-firm comparisons over the period of our analysis. Second, the data covers
fifteen-year period, which coincides with significant trade and industrial reforms undertaken independently
by both India and China.
Third, a unique feature of the dataset, upon which our study is partly based, is that it gives detailed
product-level information for each firm. Consequently, we are able to distinguish between single- and multi-
product firms and can track changes in firms’product mix over the sample period. In particular, we examine
the dynamics of the product mix of firms as a response to Chinese import competition; that is, whether
manufacturing firms add or drop products or add and drop products simultaneously or engage in none of the
preceding activities. The ability to track a firm’s product mix over time is primarily due to the Companies
Act of 1956, which requires Indian firms to disclose product-level information on capacities, production and
sales in their annual reports. As discussed in Goldberg et al. (2010a, b), product-level information is available
for 85% of the manufacturing firms who in turn accounts for more than 90% of PROWESS’manufacturing
23Although data are available till 2013, we consciously choose 2007 as the final year in order to avoid any possible effect of
the financial crisis of 2008-2009 on our results. As part of the robustness checks on our results, we extend the sample period to
2013. The results remain qualitatively the same.
24Recently, a panel dataset containing similar product-level information like PROWESS has been released by the ASI. While
this newer version of the ASI has some advantages over PROWESS (see de Loecker et al., 2016), it does not span the entire
period during which our study is concerned.
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output and exports. Additionally, product-level sales are reported to comprise 99% of the (independently)
reported manufacturing sales. To define a product, CMIE uses an internal product classification that is
based on the Harmonized System (hereafter, HS) and National Industrial Classification (hereafter, NIC)
schedules.25
The product-level information (of Indian firms) that we use has previously been used by Goldberg et
al. (2010a, b, c). Nevertheless, we also check for a few characteristics regarding whether these firms can be
regarded as multi-product or not. First, a vast array of studies find overwhelming dominance of multi-product
firms in production and trade. We find the same evidence for Indian firms as well. Table 11 (Appendix
B) presents average values for sales, capital intensity, assets, wages, TFP, share of output, share of firms
for multi-product and single-product firms. Multi-product firms sell more; are more capital intensive; are
bigger; pay higher wages and control an overwhelming proportion (91%) of the total output produced in an
industry.26
Second, as with any firm-product-level dataset, there is a concern here that these firms may not truly
be multi-product firms. For example, a firm reports producing 5 products, but its main product accounts
for 95% of its total sales and the remaining products account for 5%. To check whether such is the case, we
construct a matrix where we calculate the average share of total sales against each of the product produced
by a firm. We present the matrix in Table 12 in Appendix B. As is shown, the firms’product-specific
share of sales is much less concentrated towards its core product.27
However, there are also a few limitations of PROWESS. First, the dataset does not cover the unorganized
sector. Second, because firms are not under any legal obligation to report to the data collection agency,
PROWESS is not well suited for studying firm entry and exit.28 Third, the dataset does not give either the
trade (neither export nor import) destinations of the firms or the products traded by firms. To overcome this
deficiency, we complement our firm-level dataset with product-level trade data from UN-COMTRADE using
the Debroy and Santhanam (1993) industry-trade concordance table. Table 2 provides summary statistics
of all the variables that we use.
25As Goldberg et al. (2010c) notes, there are a total of 1,886 products linked to 108 four-digit NIC industries across the
22 manufacturing sectors (two-digit NIC codes) spanning the industrial composition of the Indian economy. In comparison,
the U.S. manufacturing data contains approximately 1,500 products, as defined by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes, thus suggesting that the definition of product in India is slightly more detailed.
26One related concern with multi-product firms is that classifying products at the HS6 level is not a very easy task and may
lead to firms incorrectly classifying products. For instance, suppose a firm were to incorrectly classify the products it produces
in a given year. Then it would spuriously appear that the firm might have increased/decreased my product range. One way
to allay fears of such measurement issues is to examine the firm-specific, year-to-year variation in the number of products. To
possibly check for this, we have calculated the year-to-year variation in the number of products across the firms. We do not see
much evidence of such measurement issues in the data. For example, we do not see many such instances, where a firm’s total
number of products are 6 in year t, then 10 in year t+ 1, and then back to 6 in year t+ 2.
27Our estimates are somewhat similar to what Goldberg et al. (2010c) finds.
28As indicated by Goldberg et al. (2010b), entry and exit is not necessarily an important margin for understanding firms in
the PROWESS dataset since the dataset contains only the large Indian firms.
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3.1.2 UN-COMTRADE
UN-COMTRADE presents destination-wise offi cial foreign trade statistics of all the countries of the world.
This is the most comprehensive dataset on trade flows that is collected and maintained by the United Nations
(UN). It gives detailed information of every country’s trade according to each of their trade destinations.
The dataset is detailed up to HS six-digit level of classification. UN-COMTRADE follows the Harmonized
System (HS) of Classification and provides both yearly and monthly statistics of countries’trade flows. The
dataset provides total quantity, total value and unit value with respect to each of the products exported
or imported and their respective destinations. The annual series is available from 1992 onwards until 2012.
It also enables a comparative analysis of any country’s trade performance in specific markets vis-à-vis its
competitors. The trade flows are given in US Dollars (US$).
Our main objective is to create a variable, which reflects the extent of import competition the Indian firms
face in the domestic market from China. To overcome the disadvantage of the PROWESS dataset regarding
the trade destinations of the firms, we match the firm-level data from PROWESS with the trade-destination
based product level UN-COMTRADE dataset. The matching procedure is explained in detail in Appendix
A.
3.2 Preliminary Analysis: Trends in Chinese Share of India’s Imports and
Product Variety
In this section, we present a few crucial stylized facts about the share of Chinese imports in India and
product scope of Indian firms. First, we show that there is a lot of heterogeneity across industries within the
Indian manufacturing sector in terms of the growth of Chinese imports relative to total imports. Figure 2
plots the share of imports from China across 22 NIC 2-digit industries for 1992-2007. The share of imports
from China rose for a large number of industries; remained almost constant for a few others; and declined
for a couple of sectors. Unsurprisingly, our plots show a steep increase in the share of imports in some
of the labour-intensive industries (e.g., Textiles, Wearing Apparel, and Leather), which is consistent with
China’s comparative advantage. Interestingly, the figure also points to an increase in the share of imports
in capital-intensive industries (e.g., Offi ce, Accounting and Computing Machinery; Electrical Machinery and
Apparatus; Communication Equipment). These patterns in the data justify, in our view, the need for further
empirical analysis.
Second, we plot the number of products manufactured by a representative Indian manufacturing firm
over the period 1992-2007 in Figure 3. It points to a clear upward trend over time. The average number
of products produced by an average Indian manufacturing firm rises from around 1 during the early 1990s
to almost 3 in 2007. The steady increase exhibited in the number of products is consistent with the finding
of Goldberg et al. (2013). However, a closer inspection of Figure 3 points out that the post-2001 period
12
has exhibited some fluctuations in the number of products produced; a slight drop in the post-2001 period,
followed by small increase, and remaining constant afterward. Additionally, the rate of growth in the increase
in the number of products also slowed down in the post-2001 period. During the period 1992-2001, the rate
of growth of products produced by a firm increased by more than 200%, whereas in the post-2001 period,
the increase dropped to a mere 20%.
We also calculate the average share of Chinese imports and average number of products produced by an
industry (at the NIC 2004 2-digit level) for two different time periods: 1992-2001 and 2002-2007 in Table
3. Columns (1) —(2) show the average share of imports from China relative to total Indian manufacturing
imports. For example, the number 1.31% (Row 1, Column 1) is the average share of Food and Beverages
(NIC 2004, Sector 15) imports from China for the period 1992-2001. The columns show that for 21 out of 22
industrial categories, the share of imports from China in total imports significantly increased especially after
2001, compared to the period before-2001.29 For an average Indian manufacturing industry, the number of
varieties produced dropped from 5.4 to 5.1, which is a change of about 6%. However, if we look across different
industries, the response is a bit mixed. For instance, while for most of the of the industrial categories (16
out of 22) there has been a decrease in the number of product varieties, we find some evidence of a marginal
increase for others. This gives us a hint to explore whether (a) there is a causal impact of import competition
on the number of product varieties produced or it is due to other factors; and (b) there is some amount of
heterogeneity involved in the effect (if any).
The main purpose of dividing the share of Chinese imports for India before and after China’s WTO
entry in 2001 is to capture the extent of Chinese import penetration, rather than industry variation in
trade barriers.30 We expect that the industries for which there was a high share (greater than 5% of total
imports) of Chinese imports before China’s entry to the WTO, the share will increase more than the others.
For example, let’s consider NIC-17 (Textiles), NIC-26 (Non-metallic Mineral Products) and NIC-30 (Offi ce,
29Among the industries that experienced phenomenal growth in their share of imports from China are Textiles; Leather
Products; Communication Equipment; Non-Metallic Mineral Products; Fabricated Metal Products; and Offi ce, Accounting and
Computing Machinery among others. In contrast, only the Food & Beverage industry recorded a decline in its share of Chinese
imports. In addition, we also divide the 108 industrial groupings (at NIC 2004 4-digit level) into two major product categories—
intermediate and final goods—and calculate the share of Chinese imports and the average number of products produced in Table
13 (Appendix B). We find that imports from China have increased for both types of product categories, with rate of growth
higher in case of intermediate goods. On the other hand, product variety of both types of goods decreased over time, with the
drop in intermediate products being higher.
30The best way to measure the Chinese comparative advantage as China joined WTO is to use tariffs data by industry. Since,
we focus on Chinese imports by India, using Chinese import tariffs data would not be useful here. Further, India’s import
tariffs data will also not be very useful here for two reasons: (a) India had a large trade liberalization program in the 1990s
and India’s import tariffs were substantially reduced by 2001; and (b) India did not have any preferential tariff agreement with
China (e.g., Pakistan has a MFN status for India and vice-versa). One might also argue that we could have used the export
tariffs data for China to see whether the fall in export tariffs due to the WTO entry in 2001 has led to an increase in Chinese
comparative advantage or not. China started to reduce its export tax from 1980s onward and it is around 3% from 1996 hence
(Zhiyuan, 2003). Therefore, looking at the export tariffs in this case would also not make much of a difference. China started
to build its economy based on exports almost more than a decade earlier (in late 70s) than India, and reduced its export tax
concurrently (much ahead of 2001). China has actually raised its export taxes since January 2004 (Garred, 2018). In addition,
all the studies, which looked at the effect of Chinese imports, used share of Chinese imports in their total imports (by industry)
as the measure of competition. We do so, by following the literature.
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Accounting and Computing Machinery). For these industries, the share of Chinese imports before 2001 was
11.20%, 5.83% and 14.96% respectively. These shares increased to 37.19%, 27.76% and 51.91%: a growth
rate of 200-400% after 2001. Similarly, seventeen NIC 2-digit sectors had import share ratios varying between
0-5% before 2001, with only five of them having more than 5% (but less than 15%). In contrast, after 2001
eight industries (out of 22 NIC 2-digit sectors) had more than 15% shares of Chinese imports, with the
highest being 51.91% (whereas the highest before 2001 was 14.96%). We calculate the correlation between
the import shares from China before and after 2001, it is around 0.9. This shows that Chinese import
penetration increased significantly in the post-2001 period for industries where it was already high in the
previous period. Using these stylized facts as our background, we now investigate whether the increase in
the import share from China is significantly correlated with (or at best caused) variations in the product
mix of manufacturing firms in India.
4 Chinese Competition and Product Variety of Indian firms
4.1 Benchmark Results
This section empirically investigates the effect of China’s rising share of exports in Indian domestic market
and an export destination, on the product variety of Indian manufacturing firms. To establish causality
between greater import competition (from China) and the product mix of Indian manufacturing firms, we
use China’s entry to the WTO on December 11th, 200131 , as a quasi-natural experiment, together with
the differential competitive pressures faced by Indian firms due to this trade shock, as our identification
strategy. The accession to the WTO is significantly driven by China’s movement towards a more market-
oriented economy. This transition to a market-oriented economy is a result of the following internal factors:
(a) significant rural-to-urban migration of workers, (b) firms/industries gaining access to foreign technologies,
capital and intermediate goods, and (c) allowing multinationals to operate in the country (Autor et al., 2013).
These internal reforms had significant positive effects on China’s trade, which eventually led to the country’s
accession to the WTO. In other words, we use China’s accession to the WTO as an instrument for the internal
reforms in China, which significantly boosted the productivity growth in various industries. We argue that
membership to the WTO led to an increase in the import share of Chinese products and thus intensified the
competition faced by Indian firms in their domestic market and one of its main export destination.
The economic reforms undertaken by China in the post-1990 period in anticipation of becoming a member
of the WTO, and thus getting fully integrated into the global economy, provides an important element of
our empirical strategy. Since China’s membership to the WTO in 2001 was influenced by factors not related
to the activities of Indian firms neither in their domestic nor export markets, therefore its accession to the
WTO can be interpreted as an exogenous shock from the standpoint of India. Furthermore, there were no
31November 10 was the date approval, but actual joining took place in December.
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trade agreements between India and China in the period prior to accession, so there is a little probability
that China’s visibility in the world trade matrix (in terms of becoming a WTO member) could be confounded
with other factors related to the activities of Indian manufacturing firms.
Notwithstanding the assumptions underlying our empirical strategy, there is one important concern that
needs to be addressed before getting on to the estimation details: whether the demand for Chinese goods by
India, especially after 2001, is due to a change in China’s export-supply capability (due to a rise in average
productivity) or import demand shocks across industries in India?32 We treat the rise in export-supply
capability of Chinese firms/industries as exogenous, as it is a function of changes in labour costs, trade costs
and the number of product varieties made in China. Failure to address this above concern may result in
biased coeffi cient estimates and therefore likely to lead to incorrect inferences drawn from our findings. In
order to control for this issue, we use an empirical strategy similar to Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), and Lu
and Yu (2015) among others.33
To avoid the effects of import demand shocks from India after 2001, we use the share of imports from
China prior to its WTO membership. Specifically, we calculate the average share of Chinese imports for
each industry at NIC 4-digit level before China’s entry to the WTO by taking a simple mean of the share of
Chinese imports by India for the years 1992-2001. One rational to use the share of imports from China before
2001 as a proxy for share of imports after 2001 is that we treat Chinese import penetration across industries
to be much less before 2001 than after. In order to see whether this is the case, we compute standard
deviation for the share of Chinese imports in India across all the NIC 4-digit Indian industries before and
after 2001. The value is 4 before 2001, which increased to around 13 for the period 2002-2007; a jump by
a factor of more than 3. Therefore, our key variable of interest will capture the extent of the prevailing
competition from China for any industrial category, but before the latter’s entry to the WTO (when the
degree of competition across industries were very similar). We expect industries with high initial import
shares to exhibit higher future growth in imports.34 In other words, our main source of variation in exposure
is within-manufacturing specialization in industries subject to different degrees of import competition.
We define AvgM01Chinaj,IN as a measure of Chinese competition that an Indian (IN) industry (j) faces in
its domestic market because of the unilateral liberalization policies pursued by China (China); it is a 10-year
32 In case of the US (which we use as a proxy for export destination), Autor et al. (2013) show that the rise in Chinese share
of the imports is not due to import demand shocks in the US, but because of an increase in comparative advantage of Chinese
goods. Moreover, this increased significantly after 2001.
33These studies use reductions in tariff levels as their measure of trade liberalization in contrast to the import share and
import penetration ratios used in this paper.
34Gudalupe and Wulf (2010) and Lu and Yu (2015) use the pre-tariff liberalization industry-level average of tariffs. In
this case, the industries that had previously been more protected (i.e., industries with higher tariffs initially) are expected
to experience greater tariff reductions after liberalization and therefore higher degrees of liberalization, whereas previously
more open industries (i.e., industries with lower tariffs initially) should experience small changes in tariffs and therefore less
liberalization. In our case, we expect the variation in import shares across industries of India (from China) to increase more
after China joined WTO in 2001. For example, before 2001, the minimum share is 0.88, whereas the maximum share is 14.96;
whereas after 2001, the minimum share is 0.25, whereas the maximum is 51.91. The minimum share remained less than 1%,
whereas, the maximum share increased by more than 300%.
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average of the share of imports by industry j for the period 1992-2001. To create the AvgM01Chinaj,IN index, we
match the Indian firm-level data with the HS six-digit product-level destination-specific data (for China) on
import flows to create a ratio that reflects the amount of competition faced by a firm i belonging to industry
j. We create this index at the NIC 2004 4-digit level using the concordance table by Debroy and Santhanam
(1993). It is defined as the share of imports by an industrial sector, say j, from China in proportion to total
imports by that sector. For example, let us consider the Textiles sector (j). The AvgM01Chinaj=Textiles,IN is the
total amount of Textile imports from China, relative to the total imports of Textiles from all countries for










imports from China for 1992−2001 for industrial category j=Textiles
imports from World for 1992−2001 for industrial category j=Textiles ]IN
We use the above ratio and interact this with a year dummy to create the following index of import




WTOt is a year dummy variable intended to capture the effect of China’s entry to the WTO. It takes a
value of 1 for the years following the signing of the WTO agreement by China. Therefore, WTOt equals 1 for
the years 2002-2007. So, our variable of interest, AvgM01Chinaj,IN ×WTOt, provides a measure of the amount
of competition faced by Indian firms in the domestic market as a result of China becoming a member of
the WTO. The interaction of AvgM01Chinaj,IN with WTOt provides a clear and exogenous measure of import
competition from China and represents a difference-in-differences approach to measure the effect of Chinese
import competition on the product variety of Indian manufacturing firms. This interaction term captures
the differential effect of Chinese competition on firms according to their trade exposure from China prior to
2001, i.e., we use average trade exposure before 2001 as a proxy for post-2001 import exposure. Alternatively,
since we expect shares of Chinese imports to rise across all sectors, it is the change in imports due to the
WTO, net of the general change post-2001, and net of possible permanent differences across industries.
We use the above measure of Chinese import competition in the following basic empirical specification






IN + firmcontrolst−1 + ϕj + ηt + θ
j
t + εijt (1)
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where our dependent variable, xijt, is the number of product varieties produced by an Indian manu-
facturing firm i belonging to sector j at time t.35 FCompChinaIN is a measure of import competition from
China faced by Indian firms in an export destination.36 We follow the same method as outlined above in




AvgM01Chinaj,US is the average share of imports from China by the US industries at NIC 2004 4-digit level
for the years on or before 2001.38 firmcontrolst−1 is a vector of variables that includes firm size, age, age
squared, an indicator for domestic or foreign ownership and a proxy for the extent of a firm’s technology
adoption.39 We use total sales of a firm as its size indicator. The extent of technology adoption is measured as
the share of R&D expenditure plus royalty payments for technical know-how in gross value-added (GVA) of
a firm. This variable captures technology differences between firms, which can potentially affect production
of a new product. All the variables are used at (t − 1) period. Since our main variable of interest is at the
industry-level, we follow (i) Moulton (1990) and include industry fixed effects ϕj in Equation (1); (ii) the
literature on the effect of import competition on firm-level changes, where a large proportion of the studies
uses industry-level fixed effects (Bernard et al., 2006; Liu, 2010; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2010; Iacovone, et
al., 2013; Li and Yu, 2015; Liang, 2017) in their estimation.40
Product variety of a firm can also be influenced by many other concurrent policy shocks. One such is
the effect of tariff liberalization. This facilitates a firm to either import higher quality intermediate goods
(when there is a drop in input tariffs) to produce more products or directly import finished products (with
a decrease in output tariffs). To control for such events, we include measures of input and output tariffs
in our estimations. Other types of shocks (such as change in labour policy or availability of more finance,
etc.) at the industry-level, which vary over time, may also influence the product choice of a firm. All these
effects are captured by θjt . It refers to either interactions between industry fixed effects and a time trend
or interactions of industry and year fixed effects. We use the specification that controls for unobserved
35Since the dependent variable is logged, we add 1 to account for single product firms.
36PROWESS gives the total number of varieties produced by each firm, but does not mention the number of products exported
by a firm. Since a sizeable percentage of these products produced by a firm are exported as well, export market competition
may also affect the product mix of the firms.
37Autor et al. (2013) shows that Chinese imports in the US increased significantly after China became a member of the
WTO. As mentioned previously, we also combine US, EU and ASEAN to construct the export market competition index.
38We use UN-COMTRADE for data on imports by the US industries from World and China at the 4-digit level. We then
match the US industries along with Indian industries using the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) of all
economic activities by the UN.
39We allow these controls to vary with the WTO dummy variable, WTOt, but the results do not change.
40We also use firm fixed-effects, but the results remain the same.
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industry characteristics (at 4-digit level), year fixed effects and the interaction between industry fixed effects
(at 4-digit level) and a time trend as our preferred one.41 ηt proxies for year fixed effects which control for
any time-specific shocks that affect all firms equally. We cluster our standard errors at the industry-level.
We start by estimating Equation (1), for which results are shown in Table 4. Overall, our results show
no effect of Chinese competition (both in domestic and export markets) on product variety of Indian firms.
Columns (1) — (8) show the results for the natural logarithm of the number of products produced by an
Indian manufacturing firm in a year regressed on DCompChinaIN , FComp
China
IN , a bunch of firm controls, along
with industry or firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and interactions of either industry fixed effects with
year trends or industry with year fixed effects. We start by using a simple measure of import competition
(both for the domestic and export markets): lagged share of Chinese imports in total imports of India,
importsChinajt−1,IN
importsTotaljt−1,IN




Columns (2) - (10) use our preferred measures of import competition, DCompChinaIN = AvgM01
China
j,IN ×
WTOt and FCompChinaIN = AvgM01
China
j,US × WTOt, where we use interaction between average Chinese
imports (by industry at 4-digit level) before 2001 (AvgM01Chinaj,IN for domestic market and AvgM01
China
j,US for
export market) and year dummy of China’s accession to the WTO (WTOt). In addition to year fixed effects
and interactions of industry fixed effects (at 4-digit level) with year trends, we interchange industry and firm
fixed effects in columns (2) and (3). The result for our variables of interest do not change: we do not find
any effect of Chinese import competition on product mix of the Indian firms at the aggregate. Column (4)
replaces interactions of industry fixed effects and year trends with industry fixed effects (at 2-digit level)
with year fixed effects, but our benchmark finding does not alter.
One common problem that is often associated with multiproduct firms is that the firms often drop
products for reasons not related to their production activities and this may affect our findings. To counter
such an issue, we use a balanced panel (of around 1000 firms) in column (5) to check whether this is true
or not. We do not find any evidence of such a case.42 Another issue that might also affect our results is
that there is a lot of correlation over time for a given firm. We counter this by running a long difference
specification in column (6). We use 1994 as the base year and compare the outcome with 2007. We find
significant negative effect of Chinese import competition in the domestic market on the product mix of Indian
manufacturing firms with no effect for export market competition. In other words, a rise in Chinese import
competition in the Indian domestic market significantly induces Indian firms to produce less products in
2007 compared to what they were producing in 1994.
One factor that might be affecting our findings is the way we look at total imports: Chinese exports might
have a positive effect if we use imports of intermediate inputs by Indian firms (Iacavone et al., 2013).43 To
41We also use interaction of industry (at 2-digit level) with year fixed effects; results do not change.
42We have also used a balanced panel using 1 year before and after China’s membership to the WTO to check for any
immediate effect. Column (1) in Table 14 of Appendix B reports the result. We continue to find no significant effect.
43For example, imported intermediate inputs may be cheaper and of higher quality than locally sourced inputs thus lowering
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account for this possibility, we generate a measure of the share of imported inputs from China by Indian
firms using Indian input-output (I-O) tables in column (7).44 We weight the I—O coeffi cient of each sector (at
NIC 4-digit level) as an input by its import share, and then by the Chinese share in imports for that sector.
By summing these measures, we arrive at a measure, ShInputsChinaIN , that gives the average weighted sum of
intermediate goods imported from China at a sectoral level, where the weights are given by the coeffi cients of
the I-O table. We continue to find no effect of Chinese import competition, both for intermediate goods and
the general index. However, we find some weak evidence of foreign competition negatively affecting firms’
product scope.
Looking only at Chinese imports by the US as a proxy for export market competition may not reveal the
true competitive effects faced by Indian firms face in export market(s). To address this possible shortcoming,
we construct an index that aggregates the shares of Chinese imports in two other primary export markets
for India firms, namely the EU and ASEAN, with that of the US. We then substitute the original foreign
competition index with the composite index based on these three export market destinations (where Indian
firms might face challenge from Chinese products) in column (8). In other words, FCompChinaIN now equals
AvgM01Chinaj,US,EU,ASEAN ×WTOt. As the coeffi cients demonstrate, our benchmark results remain the same
- we do not find any average effect of Chinese competition from either domestic or foreign markets affecting
the product scope of Indian firms. In column (9), we use the number of product varieties produced by a
firm as the dependent variable (without its logarithmic form).45 As the estimates demonstrate, changing the
dependent variable and method of estimation does not induce any change in our finding.
Following Iacovone et al. (2013) and Liu (2010), we replace our dependent variable with a binary variable
—product exit in column (10). We use firm-product-level data to define product exit. Consequently, our
panel data analysis is now three-dimensional in contrast to the two-dimensional approach adopted in our






where, xipt is a firm-product specific outcome of interest for firm i or firm-product ip at time t. It takes a
value 1 in the year when the firm or firm-product is last observed in the sample. Like, Iacovone et al. (2013),
we also drop the last year of the sample (2007) in the exit regressions, since for this year we cannot distinguish
between firms (products) that exit from those that did not. To undertake such an analysis, we employ a
probit estimation and run the regression at the firm-product-year-level. The statistical significance (or lack
thereof) of our coeffi cient of interest does not change; we find no significant effect of Chinese competition on
the production costs of the firms and making it possible to produce a greater number of products of possibly higher quality.
44We use the 1999 I-O table to choose input coeffi cients for each of the 2004 NIC 4-digit sector. We additionally test for the
robustness by substituting with 1993 I-O table, but the results remain the same.
45We estimate the regression using Poisson method as estimating a count variable by OLS may produce inconsistent estimates.
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the product mix of Indian firms at the aggregate level. Lastly, we run a first-differenced equation in column
(11); the outcome remains the same.46 This leads us to undertake the following exercise —divide the firms
according to their size and see whether there is any variation in effect across the size distribution.
Heterogeneous Effects: Following Lopresti (2016) on the issue of heterogeneity in the effects of trade
shocks on multi-product firms, we divide the set of firms into different size distributions based on their total
sales.47 Heterogeneous effects may be masked when such allowance is not made for across the sample of
firms. In other words, given that a majority of the recent studies point out that firms which are at the
right tail of the productivity distribution significantly drive economy-wide welfare changes, it is imperative
to understand whether these firms behave differently from others.
To do so, we divide the entire sample of firms into four different quartiles according to the total sales
of a firm. The different size categories of firms are indicated by a dummy variable. For example, if the
total sales of a particular firm is below the 25th percentile of the total sales of the corresponding industry,
then the firm belongs to the first quartile and the variable would indicate 1 for that particular firm, and
zero otherwise. Likewise, if a firm’s total sales lie between the 25th percentile and the 50th percentile; the
50th percentile to the 75th percentile; and above the 75th percentile of the total sales of the corresponding
industry, the firm belongs to the categories of second, third and fourth quartile, respectively. In each case,
the variable measuring the different size category takes a value of 1 for the firms that meet the respective
measurement criterion and zero otherwise. We then interact different quartile dummies with our variables
of interest, AvgM01Chinaj,IN ×WTOt and AvgM01Chinaj,US ×WTOt, to measure the effect of competition from
Chinese imports on that particular quartile of firms. Since, firms can change quartiles over the period of
analysis we use the average rank of the firms across the years in our sample.48 . Our modified equation for
estimating the effects on the different quartiles of the firms is specified as Equation (2) below:
46We perform additional estimations by controlling for other possible factors that might affect product mix, using alternative
indices of import competition, and changing the dependent variable. Results are reported in Table 14 of Appendix B. Our
aggregate findings are same as before: no effect of Chinese competition at the aggregate level. Following Goldberg et al. (2010)
and Liu (2010), we use input tariffs and imports from other low-wage countries (we use the defintion by the World Bank to
classify the low-wage countries) as possible factors affecting the product variety in columns (2) and (3). We find some weak
evidence of Chinese import competition in the domestic market negatively affecting the product scope of Indian firms. On the
contrary, we find that imports from other low-wage countries positively affecting product scope of Indian firms. This shows that
the Chinese imports did not simply replace imports from other low-wage economies. In column (4), we re-define the WTOt
dummy. It takes a value 1 if the year is greater than or equal to 2000. This is to reduce possibility of a firm’s anticipation
of China’s accession to the WTO and therefore causing firms to change their behaviour. We use import competition indices
by Liu and Rosell (2013), Mion and Zhu (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) to check for robustness of our results in columns
(5), (6), and (7), respectively. Another issue that often mentioned in case of counting the number of products produced by a
manufacturing firm is that there is likely to be some measurement issues with the data. We run a robustness check in column
(8) where the dependent variable is an indicator, which takes a value 1 for firms that produce more than one product and 0
otherwise. Such a binary variable might be less vulnerable to measurement error compared to the ones that we use. The change
of dependent variable does not alter our benchmark finding.
47We also divide firms based on their capital intensity and the results are similar. Table 16 in Appendix B presents those
results.















Columns (1) — (11) in Table 5 present the results from our estimation of Equation (2). Unlike our
previous results, where no distinction was made based on firm size, we now unearth robust evidence of
within-firm reallocation of products by Indian firms. In particular, we find significant negative effects of
Chinese import competition (in the domestic market) on the product scope of Indian manufacturing firms
across the size distribution; firms, irrespective of their size drop products in response to a rise in Chinese
share of imports. On the other hand, we find a robust positive effect of Chinese competition in the foreign
market on the product scope of firms belonging to the 3rd quartile (the marginally big firms). Our finding
is consistent with the standard theoretical predictions of the response of multi-product firms to import
competition or trade liberalization (Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011; Mayer et al., 2014).
Like Table 4, we start by using a simple lagged measure of import share from China in column (1). We
interchange industry and firm fixed effects in columns (2) and (3), use interactions of industry and year fixed
effects in column (4), restrict our sample to a balanced panel in column (5), specify a long difference in column
(6), construct an index of imported inputs in column (7), and use a different index for foreign competition in
column (8). Results across all these specifications remain the same —firms across the size distribution drop
products. However, the effect is most robust for firms in the lower-half of the size distribution. In addition,
we find that the effect is highest when we control for imported inputs. Share of imported inputs from China,
on the other hand, induces a strong positive effect on the product scope of Indian firms. This suggests that
firms having access to cheap and large variety of intermediate products from China use them to produce
their final products rather than sourcing them domestically. The report by the Ministry of Commerce,
Government. of India also points out that the growth in the intermediate inputs from China is the highest
among all other types of goods (Singh, 2012). Our finding in the case of intermediate inputs is similar to
that of Iacovone et al. (2013) for Mexican firms.
Columns (9), (10), and (11) exploit different estimation methods like in Table 4 - Poisson (without
transforming our dependent variable using log), Probit (using a binary variable in case a product is dropped),
and first-difference, respectively. Again, a change in the estimation methods does little to change our main
finding. The estimates remain stable —we find firms irrespective of size drop products as Chinese exports to
India rise.50 In short, our results across various specifications and techniques to evaluate the heterogeneous
49The regressions contain all other terms (double and individual) of the interaction.
50When we use the count of product varieties as the dependent variable in column (8), we find a significant positive effect
of export market competition on product varieties of Indian firms. This particular result provides support to the findings of
Nocke and Yeaple (2014): exporters tend to increase product scope in response to product market competition, whereas firms
producing for the domestic market reduce it. However, the effect is not robust across specifications.
21
effects of import competition from China on the manufacturing firms of India remains robust. Our coeffi cients
indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in Chinese share of imports by India in the domestic market
reduces the product scope of manufacturing firms by 0.5—43% at the mean.51 We also use other types of
specifications, for example, shortening the time period, other measures for import competition, changing the
dependent variable, etc., to check for the robustness our benchmark findings in Table 15 (Appendix B).
Our robustness checks also show heterogeneous effects of rising threat from Chinese competition on Indian
manufacturing firms in the domestic market; with the result most robust in case of the small firms (firms
belonging to 1st and 2nd quartile).52 Overall, our results show significant evidence of ‘creative destruction’
in case of Indian manufacturing firms belonging to the lower-half of the size distribution because of import
competition from China.53
IV Analysis: While in principle it is useful to use pre-trade shock (signing the WTO agreement in
2001) data (using average of the ‘share of Chinese imports’ for the years 1992-2001) as a proxy for the
contemporaneous ‘import competition index’, this could be more of a measure of long-term trade patterns
rather than a meaningful reflection of import competition shocks after the signing of the WTO agreement
itself. If this is true, then concerns regarding whether our results may be biased are legitimate. Also, if
there is an increase in the demand for particular kinds of products in India after 2001, which triggers a
disproportionate increase in Chinese imports in those categories, such as labour-intensive products, then
it is likely to have the same effect on Indian firms in those categories. This could be also true for some
unobserved technology shocks, say innovations on labour cost saving technology, which is common to both
the countries (Utar and Torres-Ruiz, 2013). These types of biases or unobservable shocks can make the effect
of Chinese competition on product variety of Indian firms endogenous.
To address the issues outlined above, we undertake an instrumental variable (IV) analysis. We follow the
current literature and use the Chinese share of imports by the EU as the instrument for import competition





In case of FCompChinaIN , we follow Utar and Torres-Ruiz (2013) and use
51Between 1992 and 2001, the mean share of India’s imports from China was 3.81%. This increased to 12.89% between 2002
and 2007. This implies that for a firm, in an industry that exhibited this mean level of change in imports from China, contracted
its product scope between (12.89-3.81) × 0.005 and (12.89-3.81) × 0.471. To understand the change in the coeffi cient due to
change in 10 percentage points change in imports, one has to multiply it by 10.
52Same in the case when we use capital intensity as the measure of size in Table 16 of Appendix B.
53The results are also the same as when we control for initial number of products. Additionally, we examine other possible
channels of influence by incorporating additional controls, both at the industry- (skill-intensity, factories, domestic production
and management technology) and firm-level (sales, export share, productivity and Herfindahl index), and interacting those with
our variable of interest, DCompChinaIN and FComp
China






The Chinese share of EU imports and world imports must be exogenous from the perspective of Indian
firms as it is expected to be driven by China itself. We use a simple first-difference model, i.e., we regress
year-to-year change in Chinese share of EU imports on year-to-year change in product scope of Indian firms.
Results from IV estimations along with their first-stages55 are presented in Table 6. The IV estimations
confirm our initial findings, with an exception. We do not find any effect of the Chinese import competition
on the product variety of large firms, i.e., firms belonging to 4th quartile. In fact, only in the case of small
firms (firms belonging to the 1st quartile) the effect significantly robust across all specifications. Our IV
results show that the contraction of the Indian manufacturing firms’product mix, in response to Chinese
imports, varies between 1.7—4.4%. Our results are partially similar to Iacovone et al. (2013) for Mexican
firms: Chinese import competition affects small firms.56
5 Untangling the Puzzle: Core Competency, Product Composi-
tion and Product Exit
This section seeks to investigate the reason(s) behind our benchmark finding: product drop in case of small
Indian firms because of Chinese import competition in the domestic market. Results appear in Table 7.
Following Liu (2010), we start by analyzing the core competency of a firm. In other words, we check out
whether this is a case of re-focusing to the core product(s), at the expense of the peripheral products, by the
Indian firms because of import competition from China. Specifically, we use the following equation at the








Our dependent variable is now at the firm-product-year level, xipjt. Core is a dummy variable, which
defines the core product of a firm. It takes a value 1 for that product, for which the average sales (over
54We do not report the coeffi cients for foreign competition due to space constraints. Even with the IV results, we do not find
any significant effect of export market competition on product variety of Indian firms.
55The 1st-stage estimations show significant correlation between our variable of interest and IV with the F-stat consistently
greater than 10. The coeffi cients for four different quartiles in the 1st-stage (i.e., the coeffi cients in the bottom panel in columns
(3), (4), (7) and (8)) are taken from four different 1st stage regressions. We report the coeffi cient respective to the regression
of that quartile.
56We also carry out IV estimations using China’s membership in the WTO in the year 2001 as structural break. In other
words, using a Bartik-type of estimation method (the method that we use primarily in Tables 4 and 5). We continue to use
the EU’s share of Chinese imports as an instrument for India’s import share from China. Qualitatively, the results remain the
same: Chinese import competition in the domestic market induces small Indian manufacturing firms to drop their products.
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time) is maximum and 0 otherwise. We interact the core product dummy with our indices of Chinese import
competition, DCompChinaIN and FComp
China
IN , to measure the required effect. In addition to industry and
year, we now use product fixed effects, γp, to control for the unobservable product characteristics in all of
our regressions.
Column (1) distinguishes the core product, i.e. the product that generates the largest share of sales within
a firm from the rest (the peripheral products), and interacts it with the import competition measures. The
coeffi cient of the interaction term, DCompChinaIN ×Core is negative and statistically significant with no effect
in case of foreign competition. The negative sign indicates that the Indian manufacturing firms drop their
peripheral products in the face of rising import competition from China in the domestic market. Column
(2) does the same estimation, but by dividing the firms by size (based on their sales, as done previously).
The coeffi cients on the four different quartiles point out that the aggregate effect (firms dropping their
peripheral products) comes from the effect of domestic market import competition on the lower-half of the
size distribution, which is consistent with our earlier results. That is, import competition induces small and
medium-sized firms to refocus on their core products by dropping their peripheral products.
Bernard et al. (2006, 2011) contend that import competition leads not only to dropping of marginally
viable products but also to a shift in the distribution of firms’ output towards high-profitable products.
Additionally, Dhingra (2013) also points out that import competition from foreign brands induces firms to
lower product innovation through within-brand cannibalization.
Following this literature, we use the following equation to capture the compositional change of a firm’s
output (with change in the sales share of core product as a share of total sales of a firm as the dependent







∆SalesShareipt is the change in the sales share of firm i for product (core) p at time t. Column (3) shows
a positive and significant relationship between the interaction of the Chinese import competition measure
(domestic market) and the core product dummy, and the change in sales share for the core product. It
indicates that an increase in import competition from China in the domestic market resulted in growth in
the share of sales for the firms’core products. Once we allow for heterogeneity based on firm size, our results
in column (4) clearly indicates that our finding in column (3) is driven mainly by the firms belonging to 1st
and 2nd quartiles of the size distribution. Increase in sales share for a core product of a firm due to Chinese
competitive pressure is to the tune of 5.3—6.5%. Overall, our finding suggests considerable support for the
core competency hypothesis i.e., higher levels of import competition from China in the domestic market
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causes multi-product firms to drop their peripheral products and instead focus on the production of their
core products. We now directly test this hypothesis.







where, xipt is a firm-product specific outcome of interest for firm i or firm-product ip at time t. It
takes a value 1 in the year when the firm or firm-product is last observed in the sample. We run probit
regressions and report the marginal effects. As shown in column (6), the coeffi cient for the interaction of
the import competition measure (for domestic market) with core product dummy is negative and significant
for all but firms belonging to the 4th quartile. The negative sign indicates that the probability of product
exit is relatively higher for peripheral products in the face of rising import competition from China. And,
the likelihood of effect (dropping of peripheral products) falls as firm size increases with no effect for large
firms. A 10-percentage point increase in Chinese share of imports decreases the probability of dropping a
core product by around 4.5% at the mean. Our estimates are less than when compared to Liu (2010) for the
US firms, which is 6.7%. We find uniform evidence that rising import competition from China in the Indian
domestic market is associated with an increasing share of core products and a decreasing share of peripheral
products. Thus, our results are indicative of more centralized distribution of production being related to the
rising import competition faced by the Indian firms. This is very consistent with the case of the U.S. firms
(Liu, 2010) and Mexican firms (Iacovone et al., 2013).57
6 Within-Firm Responses
In this section, we check for within-firm responses of Indian firms as a result of Chinese import competition.
Given the fact that we find strong evidence of product drop (as a result for import competition in the
domestic market) for certain section of firms, how does then import competition affect productivity, use of
productive factors and total sales revenue (further divided into domestic and exports) of those firms?
Mayer et al. (2014) builds a theoretical model to show that tougher competition in an export market
induces a firm to skew its export sales toward its best performing products. This within-firm change in
product mix driven by trading environment has important repercussions on firm productivity. Since our
57We additionally use the index of the share of imported intermediate goods from China, ShInputsChinaIN , and interact with
the core product dummy. The coeffi cients increase further, but only for firms in the lower-half of the size distribution. These
results suggest that small firms now make better use of the cheaper Chinese intermediate inputs to improve the competitiveness
(sales from the core products increases) of their core products.
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results point toward significant within-firm change in product mix of Indian firms as result of Chinese import
competition in the domestic market, we follow Mayer et al. (2014) and start by checking for productivity
effects for those firms in column (1). We measure productivity following Levinshon and Petrin (2003)
methodology and regress on the interaction between the Chinese import competition measure and size
dummy. Results are reported in Table 8. We find very strong confirmation of the competitive effect (in the
domestic market) on the productivity of the firms. The effects increase as firm size increases. Competitive
pressures from China in the domestic market induces a productivity gains for Indian firms in the range of
0.9—1.6%. Our results provide strong support to the theoretical predictions of Mayer et al. (2014). Other
studies (Schoar, 2002; Aw and Lee, 2008) have also shown that multi-product firms improve their effi ciencies
after re-focusing on core products.
We follow Medina (2017) and look at three important productive factors in columns (2) — (4) that
might be affected due to within-firm changes in product mix —labour expenditure, capital expenditure, and
R&D expenditure (a significant part of it is used for product innovation or branding of products). No strong
significant effect is found in any of these cases. In particular, our estimates show that import competition does
not lead firms to adjust the use of their productive factors, except for some negative effects for small firms in
case of R&D expenditure. Since firms are changing their product mix, these findings suggest that factors are
being reallocated within the firm. Firms keep employing the same amount of productive factors, but use them
more intensively on their core products. These results suggest that trade-induced competition (especially at
the domestic market) leads firms to re-focus on their core activities through within-firm factor reallocation.
These results are consistent with previous empirical findings on within-firm responses to negative shocks of
import competition (Iacovone and Javorcik, 2010; Iacovone et al., 2013).
Lastly, we use total sales, export and domestic sales as dependent variables in columns (5) —(7), respec-
tively. The estimates show that Chinese import competition in the Indian domestic market has very limited
impact on the total revenue of firms. Only small firms experience a drop in their total sales. When we divide
total sales into exports and domestic sales in columns (6) and (7), we find that the entire decrease in total
sales is a result of domestic sales of the firms belonging to the 1st quartile. Increase in Chinese imports in
the domestic market of India reduces earnings of Indian firms by around 2.5%.
7 Additional Heterogeneity —Product Categories, Export Orien-
tation and Ownership
We now seek to explore additional sources of heterogeneity in our findings by breaking down the sample of
firms by different product categories according to end-use classification, export orientation and ownership.
We start by classifying the manufacturing sector into different categories of goods (by end use) utilizing the
user-based classification of Nouroz (2001). First, we match the NIC 2004 codes with the Input-Output (I-O)
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classifications, then arrange the matched NIC categories into user-based products at 2004 NIC 4-digit level.
Finally, we categorize the entire manufacturing sector into two major sub-sectors: (1) Final goods, which
comprise of consumer durable and non-durable goods; and (2) Intermediate goods, which contain capital,
intermediate and basic goods. We do so to examine the compositional effect of Chinese import competition
i.e., how the effect varies across different types of industrial products (by end use). Results are shown in
Table 9.
Columns (1) —(2) measure the effects of Chinese import competition on the firms producing final and
intermediate goods, respectively. Our estimated coeffi cients show us: (i) small firms or firms belonging to 1st
quartile drop both intermediate and final goods, with the effect for intermediate goods larger by around 1.5
times; (ii) firms of other quartiles (2nd and 3rd) drop only intermediate goods. Our estimated coeffi cients
from column (2) provide additional support to our earlier result that access to wide range of intermediate
goods from China induce Indian firms to drop products at a much higher rate.
Combining our result on intermediate goods from this table with Table 5, one can certainly infer that the
Indian firms have a higher probability of dropping intermediate goods, when faced with Chinese competition,
rather than final goods. Our finding of ‘creative destruction’in case of Indian firms is certainly stronger in
case of intermediate goods than final goods. This result (higher incidence of drop in case of intermediate
goods) is consistent with a research report from Ministry of Commerce, Govt. of India (Singh, 2012). The
report also finds that the intermediate goods sector of India is severely affected because of rise in imports
of intermediate goods/inputs from China. Goldberg et al. (2010a, b) show that trade reforms undertaken
by India during the 1990s helped Indian manufacturing firms, especially the large ones, to import cheap,
high-quality intermediate goods. Kandilov et al. (2017) points out that 82% of those import of intermediate
goods came from 10 OECD countries. Our results show that China’s internal trade reforms and eventual
accession to the WTO in 2001 may have possibly resulted in a trade creation effect from the perspective of
Indian firms: small manufacturing firms now imports a large fraction of its intermediate inputs from China
to produce new products. We also find that export market competition induces firms across size distribution
to produce more intermediate goods with no effect on final goods.
Next, we utilize an important firm-level characteristic: export orientation. We use this to investigate
how exporters are differentially affected than non-exporters. Columns (3) and (4) report that small firms,
whether or not it is an exporter, drop its products in the face of rising import competition from China in
the domestic market. Additionally, we find evidence of an adverse effect of Chinese import competition
on product variety of firms belonging to 2nd and 3rd quartile, but only in case of non-exporters. On other
hand, we find significant evidence of product addition, across the size distribution of firms, by exporters when
facing threat from Chinese imports in the export market. This result draws support from the findings of
Baldwin and Gu (2009) in the case of Canadian and Lopresti (2016) in case of the US firms. Lastly, columns
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(5) —(6) divide firms according to ownership —domestic and foreign. The coeffi cients demonstrate strong
evidence of only domestic firms in the lower-half of the size distribution drop their products in response
to import competition from China. In addition, we find some positive evidence on the product mix of the
foreign firms, but only for firms of 2nd quartile.
8 Conclusion
The substantial rise of China as the biggest trade partner of India, especially after 2001, along with the
increase in sentiments against Chinese goods in India provides us the platform to investigate the impact of
the increase in Chinese competitive pressure on product variety of Indian firms. Using detailed product-
firm-level data, which reports product-level information for firms across all manufacturing sectors in India
spanning over two decades, we analyze the impact of such competitive pressures on Indian manufacturing
firms on both the domestic market and the export (US) market at product-level (extensive margin). We find
consistent evidence of product drop by firms belonging to lower-half of the size distribution. Our estimates
point out that for an average Indian manufacturing firm, a 10% increase in India’s Chinese share of imports
reduces the product scope by 1.7-4.4%. Small and medium-sized firms drop their peripheral or marginal
products and focus on core products. This effect is entirely concentrated due to competitive pressures
in the domestic and not export market. Next, we find significant evidences of within-firm reallocation of
resources. Lastly, Chinese competition at the domestic market helps firms in access to cheaper and diverse
set of intermediate inputs. We show firms of all sizes increase product scope from such expanded access to
imported Chinese intermediates. Intermediate inputs from China also help firms, small and medium-sized
firms, to gain more from their core products. Such increased use of Chinese imported inputs suggest a trade
diversion or trade creation effect as Indian firms were supposedly importing intermediate inputs from OECD
countries during the 1990s.
Our results are consistent with both the theoretical (Eckel and Neary, 2010; Dhingra, 2013; Mayer, 2014)
and empirical literature (Liu, 2010; Lopresti, 2016). These patterns are observed among both exporters and
non-exporters, with significantly higher effect in case of the latter and domestic private firms. We also find
that higher Chinese competition forces firms to drop both intermediate and final goods, with the effect on
the former larger. Finally, our results are consistent across a battery of robustness checks and IV analysis,
where we control for endogeneity of the import competition index using a third country’s share of imports
from China (EU imports from China) as an instrument.
These results show that rise of China as one of the important trade partners of India has significantly
influenced production patterns for firms in India (a similar country in terms of income and wage). This finding
could potentially be relevant for policy makers and firms in India and worldwide. Chinese competitive
pressure at the domestic market forces smaller firms to drop their products, reallocates their productive
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factors toward its best product(s), which in turn increases average productivity. This increase in aggregate
productivity can contribute to higher income and economic welfare in the long-run. Use of productive
factors effi ciently and increase in average productivity can contribute toward consumers’benefits and other
distributional consequences. However, this is outside the scope of the current paper and we cannot comment
on how the Chinese competitive pressure has affected overall economic welfare in India.
Despite growing trade deficit with China and understandable domestic political and public resistance,
insulating the domestic market from competition from China may likely to be harmful to productivity,
as it would benefit less productive firms and marginal products. It could only be a partial solution to
local economic distress. Policy should aim to accommodate reallocation as a key to productivity growth
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Figure 1: Share of Imports from China by Indian Manufacturing Industries, 1992-2007
Notes: Figures represent the average share of Chinese imports in total imports across manufacturing industries in a
given year.
33
Figure 2: Share of Chinese Imports across 2-digit Manufacturing Industries, 1992-2007
Notes: Figures represent the average share of Chinese imports in total imports across each 2-digit manufacturing
industry (at NIC 2004) in a given year.
34
Figure 3: Number of product varieties produced by an Indian Manufacturing Firm,1992-2007
Notes: Figures represent the average number of product varieties produced by a representative Indian
manufacturing firm in a given year.
35
Table 1: India’s Trade with China and Others








1992 2.32 2.60 18.95 38.27 124.42 402.50
2001 20.51 10.35 48.88 36.21 116.11 568.70
2007 218.80 84.51 187.24 126.48 288.42 1946.65
Growth (1992-2007) 9339.34% 3150.38% 888.07% 230.49% 131.81% 383.64%






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Chinese Imports and Product Variety of Indian Firms - Before and After 2001













(1) (2) (3) (4)
15 Foods Products and Beverages 1.31 0.25 5.33 5.33
16 Tobacco Products 1.99 4.42 6.97 6.42
17 Textiles 11.20 37.19 3.78 4.09
18 Wearing Apparel 11.46 18.13 3.89 3.52
19 Leather 4.53 17.98 5.29 4.51
20 Wood and Wood Products 1.70 9.68 6.06 5.76
21 Paper and Paper Products 0.81 3.35 3.87 3.79
22 Recorded Media 1.03 3.62 3.94 2.82
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum, Nuclear Fuel 1.01 2.25 6.10 5.94
24 Chemical and Chemical Products 7.96 17.79 6.49 6.05
25 Rubber and Plastics 2.71 13.73 4.32 4.42
26 Non-metallic Mineral Products 5.83 27.76 4.36 4.25
27 Basic Metals 1.43 4.61 4.80 4.87
28 Fabricated Metal Products 2.14 10.10 4.13 4.55
29 Machinery and Equipment 1.67 8.21 5.79 5.27
30 Offi ce, Accounting & Computing Machinery 14.96 51.91 6.70 7.03
31 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 3.08 13.64 7.09 6.97
32 Communication Equipment 4.96 22.60 7.51 6.83
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments 1.23 3.85 6.15 6.00
34 Motor vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 0.38 2.82 6.50 7.44
35 Other transport equipment 1.14 8.07 5.23 5.20
36 Furniture; Manufacturing n.e.c 1.29 1.56 4.41 3.52
Average 3.81 12.89 5.36 5.09
Notes: Numbers represent average across multi-product firms belonging to each industrial category according to
National Industrial Classification (NIC) 2004 2-digit level. ‘Chinese Imports/World Imports’is the share of Chinese
imports in total imports of India. ‘Product Variety’is the average number of products produced by a multi-product


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A Matching PROWESS data with UN-COMTRADE data
The classification of the firms in the PROWESS dataset is at NIC level58 , whereas data in UN-COMTRADE
is given in HS Code. To facilitate the matching between trade flows and firm-level data, Debroy and San-
thanam (1993) provides a document which matches the HS code items with the industrial groups (classified
according to NIC). However, the concordance table by Debroy and Santhanam (1993) uses 1987 NIC classi-
fication to match the industrial groups with the HS code items. Therefore, prior to matching the firm-level
with trade flows data, we do the following: first match 1987 NIC codes with the NIC 1998 codes, which is
the next revision of the industrial group classification, and then match the NIC 1998 codes with NIC 2004
classification, which is the version we use to analyze the data.
We then proceed as follows: first, using the concordance of Debroy and Santhanam (1993), we match
all the relevant product lines (HS six-digit level) for each of the industrial categories at 2004 NIC 4-digit
level. Our goal is to create a region-specific, in our case China, import competition index which we can use
to explore the effects on the product variety of Indian manufacturing firms. To construct such an index,
we first sum the values of all the HS code items belonging to each of the industrial group (let’s say Textile
Garments) to obtain the amount of imports by that particular industrial group (Textile Garments) with
respect to China. In other words, the product level import flows data is aggregated to the industry-level
(4-digit NIC) to understand how much an industrial category (4-digit NIC 2004) imports from China.
We then follow the same procedure for the total imports of India. At the end, we are able to match
around 90-95% of the HS six-digit level products with each of the 2004 NIC four-digit level industrial chapters.
These industry level measures are then matched with firms in the firm-level dataset, PROWESS, based on
the identified industry of the firms. An average industrial sector of India imports around 8.5% of its total
imports from China (over the period 1992-2007), whereas the maximum is 93.25%, pointing out a significant
amount of heterogeneity across different industrial sectors. Therefore, the estimations that we will eventually
run will use the number of firm-level product varieties as reported in PROWESS to see if the industry-level
measure of import competition influences the product scope at the firm-level.
We acknowledge that it would be ideal to have firm-level information on imports from different countries,
as our industry-level import competition measure is likely to leave a lot of intra-industry heterogeneity
unexplained. However, in the absence of any such dataset (as in the case of India), which gives firm-
level trade information by countries, ours is a workable second-best option that is commonly used in the
literature. Iacovone et al. (2013) and Utar and Torres-Ruiz (2013) also uses this kind of industry-level
58As described earlier, we reclassify our firm level data at 4-digit NIC 2004 from 5-digit NIC 2008 to facilitate matching with
trade data and other datasets.
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Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.873
Vietnam 0.868
Korea, Rep. 0.862
Notes: The table reports the top ten countries in terms of technological similarity with China. Source: Julian di
Giovanni et al. (2014).











Share of Output 91% 9%
Share of Firms 74% 26%
Notes: Numbers represent average values across manufacturing firms in India in a year. Values are in INR Million.
Table 12: Distribution of Products Within a Firm
Number of Products Produced by a Firm
Average Share of Product
in Firm Sales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
1 100 86 77 67 63 61 60 58 54 47
2 14 20 24 21 19 20 17 23 20
3 3 7 10 9 10 8 11 11
4 3 4 6 5 7 5 8
5 2 3 3 5 3 4
6 2 1 3 2 3
7 1 1 1 2
8 1 1 2
9 1 1
10+ 2
Notes: The columns indicate the number of products produced by a firm. The rows indicate the share of products
in total firm sales. Each cell is a simple average across all the relevant firm products in the sample (1992-2007).
48
Table 13: Chinese Imports and Product Variety of Indian Firms: Product Categories (Intermediate and
Final Goods)
Share of Imports from China (%) Product variety
1992-2001 2002-2007 1992-2001 2002-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intermediate Goods 4.45 18.15 4.60 4.12
Final Goods 5.34 17.54 4.26 4.15
Notes: The numbers represent average across all firms belonging to each industrial category according to National
Industrial Classification (NIC) 2004 4-digit level. ‘Share of Imports from China’is the percentage share of Chinese
imports in total imports. ‘Product Variety’is the average number of products produced by a manufacturing firm in
these product categories.
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